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ABSTRACT. Foucault’s remarks concerning psychoanalysis are ambivalent and even prima facie 
contradictory, at times lauding Freud and Lacan as anti-humanists, at others being severely critical 
of their imbrication within psychiatric power. This has allowed a profusion of interpretations of 
his position, between so-called ‘Freudo-Foucauldians’ at one extreme and Foucauldians who 
condemn psychoanalysis as such at the other. In this article, I begin by surveying Foucault’s 
biographical and theoretical relationship to psychoanalysis and the secondary scholarship on this 
relationship to date. I pay particular attention to the discussion of the relationship in feminist 
scholarship and queer theory, and that by psychoanalytic thinkers, as well as attending to the 
particular focus in the secondary literature on Foucault’s late work and his relationship to the 
figure of Jacques Lacan. I conclude that Foucault’s attitude to psychoanalysis varies with context, 
and that some of his criticisms of psychoanalysis in part reflect an ignorance of the variety of 
psychoanalytic thought, particularly in its Lacanian form. I thus argue that Foucault sometimes 
tended to overestimate the extent of the incompatibility of his approach with psychoanalytic ones 
and that there is ultimately no serious incompatibility there. Rather, psychoanalysis represents a 
substantively different mode of inquiry to Foucault’s work, which is neither straightforwardly 
exclusive nor inclusive of psychoanalytic insights. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The question of Michel Foucault’s relationship to psychoanalysis is a vexed one and has 
become a matter of great contention. Foucault was unquestionably influenced by Freud, 
like all French intellectuals of his generation, and occasionally laudatory towards Freud’s 
thought, as he was towards the anti-humanist psychoanalytical thought of the most 
prominent intellectual acolyte of Freud in Foucault’s own milieu, Jacques Lacan; at other 
times, however, Foucault was pointedly critical of psychoanalysis for its association with 
modern strategies of power. Accordingly, a spectrum of scholarly readings of the 
relationship has emerged, ranging from those that see Foucault as largely compatible with 
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psychoanalysis to those that treat him as its staunch opponent. The coexistence of 
Foucauldian and psychoanalytic perspectives in the humanities has given rise to novel 
hybridisations of the two as well as mutual denunciations between partisans of both sides. 
I want to suggest that the denunciations are misguided, and that Foucauldian and 
psychoanalytic – and particularly Lacanian – perspectives can coexist, while nonetheless 
resisting the elision of real differences between the two found in some prominent hybrid 
approaches. I will argue, moreover, that this was more or less the conclusion that Foucault 
himself had reached by his later years. My novel contentions here, in an area where much 
has been said and where debate continues, are that Foucault was effectively mistaken if 
he ever thought his position to be strongly antithetical to psychoanalysis, and that if 
Foucault missed his encounter with psychoanalysis, it was by a deliberate methodological 
choice. 
I will begin by surveying Foucault’s remarks on psychoanalysis chronologically and 
relatively superficially. I do this largely without interpretative gloss in order to prepare 
the ground to understand the diversity of interpretations that we then encounter when I 
go on to canvass the secondary literature on the relation between Foucault and 
psychoanalysis. I aim for completeness in this regard: my intention here is to be 
comprehensive in considering the variety of readings of Foucault’s relation to 
psychoanalysis, even if this means necessarily sacrificing the depth of engagement with 
any particular scholar in favour of an extensiveness of purview. I pay special attention to 
feminist interpretations and those in queer theory, to treatments of his thought by 
psychoanalytic thinkers, to his relationship with Lacan, and to commentary on the place 
of psychoanalysis in relation to Foucault’s late work. Through engagement with the 
various tendencies in the secondary literature, I make the following four main 
conclusions: 
 
1. attempts to read Foucault as either having no serious disagreement with or as 
being entirely opposed to psychoanalysis are untenable; 
2. there is some variation in Foucault's views over time and with respect to different 
facets of psychoanalysis and different psychoanalytical thinkers (broadly – but of 
course things are more complicated than this in ways I will indicate – Foucault 
goes through a long phase of critical sympathy for psychoanalysis lasting until 
circa 1970, after which he enters a more strongly critical phase lasting until 1977, 
after which he enters a phase of terminal silence about psychoanalysis; Foucault 
tends to have more respect for psychoanalysis as a theory than as a practice, and 
for Lacan than for Freud); 
3. attempts to read Foucault with psychoanalysis based on concepts shared between 
the two are problematic; on the contrary, the best readings note the extent to which 
Foucault understands key concepts in different ways to their psychoanalytic 
meanings; 
4. Foucault tends to overestimate his distance from psychoanalysis in this way 
because he makes a deliberate methodological choice to keep his distance from 
Foucault On Psychoanalysis 
Foucault Studies, No. 28, 96-119.  98  
psychoanalysis theoretically and thus does not keep up with Lacan's developing 
thought in particular. This is not then lamentable so much as necessary for 
Foucault to follow the intellectual trajectory he did. What it does imply, however, 
is that Foucauldianism is a methodological orientation that need not be exclusive 
of or antithetical to psychoanalysis, although it also implies that combining 
Foucault and psychoanalysis is a difficult task that few if any have managed 
without eliding important features of one side or the other. 
2. FOUCAULT’S AMBIVALENCE 
While it has been said that Foucault was never particularly interested in psychoanalysis1 
– a point to which I will return – he worked in an intellectual milieu where it was 
ubiquitous. The result is that we may say that ‘Foucault’s work is heavy with Freud’s 
unstated presence’.2 Joël Birman contends (as do Jacques Derrida, Lynne Huffer and John 
E Toews in their own ways) that Foucault’s relation to psychoanalysis is a permanent 
force throughout his thought, even where he makes no explicit mention of it.3 
Foucault’s earliest publications show him at that time to be a sympathetic critic of 
psychoanalysis: his first book, Mental Illness and Personality, published in 1954, followed 
the fashions of the day in combining psychoanalysis, phenomenology and Marxism, 
though it is critical of classical Freudian psychoanalysis in favour of newer evolutionary 
psychology. In the same year, Foucault’s French translation of the Heideggerian 
psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger’s Dream and Existence appeared, with a long translator’s 
introduction in which Foucault inveighs that psychoanalysis needs the supplement of 
Martin Heidegger’s existential phenomenology to account for certain dimensions of 
human experience. 
Foucault’s next book, his 1961 doctoral thesis The History of Madness, sees him largely 
depart from his earlier theoretical coordinates through a highly original study of the 
development of modern attitudes to insanity. Psychoanalysis is mentioned only relatively 
marginally here since the historical scope of the study predates it. Foucault nevertheless 
does indicate that he sees psychoanalysis as emanating from historical tendencies of 
which he is critical, most obviously the privilege of the doctor in relation to the patient, 
albeit while suggesting that psychoanalysis is less problematic than other tendencies of 
modern psychiatry and psychology. 
After this, throughout the rest of the 1960s, his attitude to psychoanalysis would seem 
to be mainly sympathetic. In 1962, a revised version of his first book, now retitled Mental 
Illness and Psychology, appeared, which Adrian Switzer suggests is closer to 
 
1 Maurice Blanchot “Michel Foucault as I Imagine Him” [1986] in Foucault/Blanchot (1987), 73. 
2 Patrick H Hutton, “Foucault, Freud, and the Technologies of the Self,” in Technologies of the Self, ed. Luther 
H Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H Hutton (1988), 121. 
3 Joel Birman, Foucault et la psychanalyse (2007), 7; Jacques Derrida “‘To Do Justice to Freud’: The History of 
Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis,” Critical Inquiry, 20:2 (1994); Lynne Huffer, Mad For Foucault (2010); 
John E Toews, “Foucault and the Freudian Subject: Archaeology, Genealogy, and the Historicization of 
Psychoanalysis,” in Foucault and the Writing of History, ed. Jan Goldstein (1994). 
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psychoanalysis than the original.4 In 1964, Foucault presented a paper, ‘Nietzsche, Freud, 
Marx’, situating Freud alongside the other two eponymous thinkers as together 
constituting a major turning point in the Western history of interpretation, while 
nonetheless being somewhat critical of Freud’s interpretative mode. By the mid-sixties, 
‘psychoanalysis was a prominent topic in Foucault’s courses. Foucault had long ago 
renounced Marx, but he remained very attached to Freud.5 Foucault’s 1966 The Order of 
Things finds him expressing a positive attitude towards psychoanalysis, both taking it as 
a model (positing a ‘cultural unconscious’ behind scientific knowledge as a guiding notion 
for the study)6 and lauding it in the concluding chapter as one of several contemporary 
innovations that point in the direction of a radically new knowledge associated with the 
putative end of ‘man’ as the privileged centre of scientific inquiry.7 Though Foucault here 
situates Freud as belonging to an outmoded order, in the end he effectively aligns himself 
with the contemporary French ‘structuralist’ movement, explicitly including 
psychoanalysis in this connection in a way that can only mean to refer to the pre-eminent 
French psychoanalyst of the day, Jacques Lacan.8 Though Foucault does not name him in 
this book – Alain Badiou casts Foucault’s avoidance of formally engaging with Lacan as 
Foucault’s sole form of ‘conformism’9 – he does mention Lacan in salutary terms in this 
connection in an interview later the same year.10 Lacan incidentally criticised details of 
Foucault’s Order of Things in his seminar the week before that interview went to print, 
leading Foucault himself to attend Lacan’s following seminar to hear more of this 
discussion.11 Nonetheless, Foucault continues to echo his earlier, positive assessment of 
psychoanalysis in passing in his next book, The Archaeology of Knowledge.12 
During the 1970s, however, coinciding with Foucault’s political turn and new 
‘genealogical’ methodology, he effectively returns to his historical critique of 
psychoanalysis from the History of Madness. In the lecture series (most particularly 1973–
74’s Psychiatric Power) culminating in 1976 in the first volume of his History of Sexuality, he 
produces a critical genealogy of psychiatry, taking up historically where the History of 
Madness had left off, and thereby extending its critique of psychoanalysis. Foucault posits 
psychoanalysis now as a privileged point of intersection between the medicalisation of 
society and the development of confessional practices. These practices underpin what 
Foucault calls ‘subjection’ (assujettissement), a peculiarly modern process of subject 
formation that simultaneously subjugates the individual and constitutes them in their 
 
4 Adrian Switzer, “Psychoanalysis” in The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, ed. Leonard Lawlor and John Nale 
(2014), 413. 
5 Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault [1989] (1991), 139. 
6 Foucault, The Order of Things [1966] (1970), 380. 
7 Ibid., 373ff. 
8 Ibid., 361. 
9 Alain Badiou, Pocket Pantheon [2008] (2009), 124. 
10 Michel Foucault, Dits et écrits 1 (1994), 514. 
11 Thomas Brockelman, “The other side of the canvas: Lacan flips Foucault over Velázquez,” Continental 
Philosophy Review 46: 271 (2013). 
12 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge [1976] (2002), 14. 
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individuality.13 While acknowledging psychoanalysis’s resistance to the pervasive racism 
of the early twentieth century, Foucault accuses Freud of colluding with at least three 
tendencies of which Foucault is critical. Specifically, Foucault alleges that Freud builds 
traditional, patriarchal family relations into his metapsychology, that Freud’s focus on the 
sexual contributes to the production of sexuality, a normalising regime of power in which 
people are encouraged to classify themselves according to their desires, and that Freud’s 
focus of ‘repression’ perpetuating a model of the operation power that ignores its 
productivity.14 
After this point, however, Foucault never again, in his remaining six years of life and 
work, makes critical remarks about psychoanalysis. This is perhaps unsurprising 
inasmuch as the focus of his research moves to historical periods and themes that have 
relatively little to do with psychoanalysis, first to the development of modern 
government, then to ancient ethics, leading up to his death in 1984. However, this period 
sees Foucault thematise subjectivity to a greater degree than ever before, which might 
have provided a venue for a renewed engagement with psychoanalysis but did not. The 
solitary exception to this is an unplanned engagement with psychoanalysis in response to 
audience questions about Lacan during his 1982 lecture series, The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject. Here, Foucault situates himself and Lacan as engaged in parallel projects 
concerning the relation of truth and subjectivity (with Foucault seeing himself as 
following Heidegger in this regard).15 Pace Switzer’s reading of these lectures,16 this does 
not amount to a repudiation of psychoanalysis as such so much as an unprecedented 
stance of deliberate, public neutrality towards it. 
3. TENDENCIES OF SECONDARY RECEPTION 
The secondary scholarship on Foucault’s relation to psychoanalysis is extensive and 
diverse, reflecting and magnifying the diversity of Foucault’s own views.  
Given Foucault’s insistence that we should not expect authors to maintain the same 
position throughout their lives,17 one might be tempted to read him as simply changing 
his mind a number of times in relation to psychoanalysis. Perhaps surprisingly, though, 
few commentators have actually read him as vacillating in this way in relation to 
psychoanalysis; the only prominent example is Didier Eribon.18 More critically one might 
allege that Foucault is simply confused or self-contradictory in his views, but no 
commentators actually do, although Jacques Derrida does consider this possibility before 
dismissing it.19 Instead, secondary scholarship typically casts Foucault as having a single 
orientation (albeit often one that is complex and internally differentiated) towards 
 
13 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality 1 [1976] (1978). 
14 Ibid., 150. 
15 Michel Foucault, Abnormal [1999] (2004), 189. 
16 Switzer, “Psychoanalysis,” 415. 
17 Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, 19. 
18 Eribon, Michel Foucault. 
19 Derrida, “‘To Do Justice to Freud’.” 
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psychoanalysis across his work. However, the scholarship is divided as to what this 
orientation is. I would suggest that the secondary literature falls into two broad camps 
regarding Foucault’s stance in relation to psychoanalysis.  
One group of commentators take Foucault and psychoanalysis ultimately to be 
mutually opposed, this opposition outweighing any contradictory remarks of Foucault’s. 
One finds both Foucauldian and psychoanalytic scholars taking such a position: the 
Foucauldian side includes Hubert Dreyfus, James Bernauer, Eribon, Toews, Chloë Taylor, 
and Huffer; on the psychoanalytic side may be counted Joan Copjec and Mladen Dolar.20 
I will contend that such readings cannot, ultimately, account sufficiently for Foucault’s 
positive comments about psychoanalysis. 
Given Foucault’s mixed remarks about psychoanalysis, the more obvious and more 
common interpretation of his relationship to it is one of ambivalence. Scholars differ in 
their interpretations of the logic of this ambivalence. Both Foucauldians and 
psychoanalytically oriented scholars have attempted to explicate this, including Arnold I 
Davidson from a Foucauldian perspective, and Christopher Lane, Teresa de Lauretis, 
Jacques-Alain Miller, Joel Whitebook, and Derrida from more psychoanalytically oriented 
ones.21 There are also scholars who treat Foucault and psychoanalysis as more-or-less 
compatible, but, as I will discuss below, this is inevitably either via the refutation of 
Foucault’s criticisms of psychoanalysis22 or by eliding the differences.23 
In what follows, I will consider these multitudinous readings in detail under the four 
thematic heads already mentioned, namely those of feminism and queer theory, the 
psychoanalytic reception of Foucault, the relation of Foucault to Lacan, and the 
psychoanalytic relevance of Foucault’s late thought. While I am sympathetic to both 
Foucault and psychoanalysis, I have adopted neither a Foucauldian nor a 
psychoanalytical methodology here, not least because I do not believe such an approach 
would be apt to produce the kind of balanced assessment that I am aiming to achieve. 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, it is rather easy to diagnose Foucault and his followers 
(and indeed anyone else who might have disagreements with psychoanalysis) as evincing 
a psychological resistance to Freud’s insights that merely confirms their correctness. From 
a Foucauldian perspective, it is easy enough to dismiss psychoanalysis as essentialising, 
 
20 Dreyfus, Hubert, “Introduction to the California Edition,” in Mental Illness and Psychology, (author) Michel 
Foucault (1987); James W Bernauer, Michel Foucault's Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics for Thought (1992); 
Eribon, Michel Foucault ; Toews, “Foucault and the Freudian Subject”; Chloë Taylor, The Culture of Confession 
(2009); Huffer, Mad for Foucault; Joan Copjec, Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists (1994); Milan Dolar, 
“Cutting Off the King’s Head,” in Lacan Contra Foucault: Subjectivity, Sex, and Politics, ed. Nadia Bou Ali and 
Rohit Goel (2019). 
21 Arnold I Davidson, “Foucault, Psychoanalysis, and Pleasure” in Homosexuality & Psychoanalysis, ed. Tim 
Dean and Christopher Lane (2001); Christopher Lane, “The Experience of the Outside: Foucault and 
Psychoanalysis” in Lacan in America, ed. Jean-Michel Rabaté (2000); Teresa de Lauretis, Freud’s Drive (2008); 
Jacques-Alain Miller, “Michel Foucault and Psychoanalysis” [1989] in Michel Foucault: Philosopher, ed. 
Timothy J Armstrong (1992); Joel Whitebook, “Against Interiority: Foucault’s Study with Psychoanalysis” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed. Gary Gutting (2005); Derrida, “‘To Do Justice to Freud’.” 
22 E.g. Leo Bersani, Homos (1995). 
23 E.g. Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power (1997). 
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too systematic, and aligned with various strategies of power, both discursive and 
institutional. For such reasons, I think most scholars who have tackled the relationship 
between the two have not untangled the knot it represents but rather merely intervened, 
however lucidly, in favour of one side or the other. 
4. FEMINISM AND QUEER THEORY: 
FREUDO-FOUCAULDIANISM VERSUS ANTI-ESSENTIALISM 
Foucault’s thought and psychoanalysis have been preponderant influences in the 
development over the last three decades of the closely related discourses of queer theory 
and academic feminism of the ‘third-wave’. As Huffer argues in Mad for Foucault, the 
former discourse in particular has been dominated by a mélange of these two influences. 
This has resulted in what she calls a ‘Freudo-Foucauldian’ tendency that takes Foucault 
and psychoanalysis to be easily compatible or complementary discourses.24 The most 
prominent and influential figure implicated here is Judith Butler, whose work inter alia 
makes copious use of both Foucault’s thought and psychoanalysis without critically 
examining the difficulties in doing so. The original thought she thus develops is beyond 
the scope of this article to consider as it is beyond the remit of Huffer’s criticism. Huffer 
rather means to point out here the extent to which Butler and others’ combinatory use of 
Foucault and psychoanalysis has served (however inadvertently) to occlude the former’s 
very real criticisms of the latter. Given that Foucault does not try to provide anything 
approaching a metapsychology, psychoanalysis provides for ‘Freudo-Foucauldians’ like 
Leo Bersani and Butler a psychological supplement to Foucault’s political insights.25 Such 
writers do not totally ignore any differences between Foucault and psychoanalytic theory 
– Butler (1997) situates herself ‘between Freud and Foucault’, which in itself clearly 
implies a difference between the two – but they do not dwell on them. This is because they 
are not engaging in secondary scholarship on the Foucault–psychoanalysis relationship 
but rather developing their own original perspectives and insights. Thus, such primary 
works are in general not the places to look for insights into the relationship of Foucault 
and psychoanalysis, even if they might teach us much about the potentialities of both 
perspectives. An exception to this rule is Bersani’s brief discussion of psychoanalysis 
directly in relation to Foucault in Homos, claiming that Foucault’s criticism of 
psychoanalysis around sexuality results from a conceptual confusion. I will revisit this 
thesis when discussing such conceptual questions in section 7 below.  
Unlike Bersani’s en passant conciliation, however, dedicated secondary scholarship by 
feminists and queer theorists on the Foucault–psychoanalysis connection has tended in 
the direction of invoking Foucault against psychoanalysis. This tendency is exemplified 
by Huffer herself, as well as by Eribon and Taylor. However, these different thinkers 
pursue quite different arguments in pursuit of this conclusion. The main problem posed 
 
24 Mad for Foucault; see also Lynne Huffer, “Freudo-Foucauldian Politics and the Problem of History,” 
Contemporary Political Theory 15:1 (2016). 
25 Bersani, Homos, 100. 
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for all such readings of Foucault as more or less anti-psychoanalytic is how to deal with 
his many sympathetic comments about psychoanalysis. Most of these readings simply do 
not or cannot account for these comments, as I will now note in relation to each particular 
case. 
Perhaps the most extreme account of Foucault as anti-psychoanalytic is Toews’s 
reading.26 While neither feminist nor queer, Toews focuses on the same basic question that 
occupies feminist and queer critics of psychoanalysis, namely the conception of 
subjectivity implied by psychoanalysis. Toews reads Foucault’s entire intellectual project 
as amounting to a critique of psychoanalysis qua the point at which the scientific impulse 
and the problematisation of the subject meet in late modernity. Toews notes Foucault’s 
positive comments about psychoanalysis through the 1960s but does not explain them, 
which I would suggest leaves his thesis unproven. 
Two more recent readings of Foucault against psychoanalysis by feminist 
philosophers, Taylor and Huffer, largely ignore this contradictory evidence in Foucault’s 
corpus. Taylor nonetheless considers the lack of any explicit, direct condemnation of 
psychoanalysis as such by Foucault to be a difficulty for her account.27 She reasonably 
suggests, indeed, that Foucault would not condemn psychoanalysis outright even if he 
were minded to.28 One might mention in this regard, though she does not, Foucault’s well 
known disdain for polemics; Taylor instead suggests that Foucault would not engage with 
psychoanalysis at its own level because he needs to remain outside of it to critique it. Such 
an argument, however, belies the presence of psychoanalytic concepts in Foucault’s work 
and is thus directly opposed by Derrida’s reading of Foucault’s relation to psychoanalysis, 
discussed below. Ultimately, Taylor condemns psychoanalysis in a normative way quite 
foreign to Foucault’s own modus operandi, namely based on a set of canonical feminist 
values that psychoanalysis allegedly violates.  
One might argue though that if Taylor’s morality is un-Foucauldian, psychoanalysis 
should also be condemned by the same logic from a Foucauldian standpoint for its own 
normativity. Taylor herself makes a convincing case that there is a strong moralising-
normalising tendency in Freud’s work,29 but there is reason to think this is an issue specific 
to Freud that psychoanalysis in general has not necessarily inherited from him: 
Whitebook  situates the problem of patriarchal prejudices in Freud in particular as a 
symptom of his age that later analysts have been able to jettison.30 Taylor indeed ends up 
allowing that psychoanalytic thinking can escape such problems, holding up Kelly 
Oliver’s thought as a singular example of this.31 
Huffer, for her part, proceeds primarily by criticising others for failing to note 
Foucault’s opposition to psychoanalysis, in particular in the first volume of the History of 
 
26 “Foucault and the Freudian Subject.” 
27 Culture of Confession. 
28 Ibid., 134. 
29 Ibid., 137ff. 
30 Joel Whitebook, “Freud, Foucault and ‘the dialogue with unreason’,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 25:6 
(1999), 41. 
31 Culture of Confession, 153 ff. 
Foucault On Psychoanalysis 
Foucault Studies, No. 28, 96-119.  104  
Sexuality – although this is, on my account and the accounts of others I will discuss below, 
one of the main loci for Foucault’s critique of psychoanalysis, it is true that this is the key 
Foucault reference for those whom Huffer deems ‘Freudo-Foucauldians’. Huffer’s 
corrective to such misreadings is to focus on the History of Madness with its criticism of 
psychoanalysis. I am sympathetic to the project of troubling the elision of differences 
between Foucault and psychoanalysis by the Freudo-Foucauldians, which has certainly 
served to generate a widespread false impression of Foucault’s relationship to 
psychoanalysis. However, in the pursuit of this aim, in my view, Huffer produces 
something that the Freudo-Foucauldian camp does not, namely an explicit (rather than 
merely implicit) account of Foucault’s relation to psychoanalysis, which I want to deal 
with as a step on the road to reaching the best synthetic view I can of the Foucault-
psychoanalysis relation. It might seem unfair to focus on this while not engaging in a 
direct critique of, for example, Butler, on the same issue, but this is because Butler does 
not actually offer a direct reading of the Foucault-psychoanalysis relation that would fall 
within the remit of this essay to discuss, and also because I have repeatedly critiqued 
Butler’s readings of Foucault elsewhere.32 Conversely, I am reading Huffer selectively in 
relation to the particular question in hand and do not pretend to be giving an overall 
assessment of or do justice to the richness of her work (indeed, the same thing can be said 
to some or other extent of every thinker under discussion here). 
In relation to Foucault’s overall stance in relation to psychoanalysis, Huffer pays scant 
attention to the intervening decade-and-a-half of Foucault’s thought between his histories 
of madness and sexuality. By Huffer’s lights, this is unnecessary: on her reading, Foucault 
in The History of Madness excoriates psychoanalysis so severely that any later remarks of 
his to the contrary appear relatively marginal and inconsequential by comparison. This 
reading depends on an identification of psychoanalysis as being so strongly in continuity 
with the earlier history of psychiatry that Foucault’s entire critique of psychiatry in the 
History of Madness can be read as a critique of psychoanalysis. Huffer thus quotes 
comments by Foucault that are not directed specifically towards psychoanalysis as if they 
are so directed. This identification of the broad sweep of Foucault’s archaeology in this 
book as condemnatory of psychoanalysis is not a justifiable inference, however: 
Foucault’s treatment of psychoanalysis in that book is, as I have already suggested, 
marginal and outside of the main historical frame of his analysis.  
By contrast, Eribon argues in more or less the exact opposite direction to Huffer in 
relation to Foucault’s critique of psychoanalysis, inasmuch as he reads Foucault’s early 
work as not only sympathetic to psychoanalysis33 but as fundamentally psychoanalytic, 
although he maintains that Foucault dramatically changed his orientation towards 
psychoanalysis such that his mature position was thoroughly anti-psychoanalytical, 
matching Eribon’s own position.34 Against this, we may invoke Huffer’s argument that it 
 
32 See in particular Mark G E Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault (2009), 88–96, 100–103, 120–121. 
33 Michel Foucault, 272. 
34 Specifically, Didier Eribon “Toward an Ethics of Subjectivation: French Resistances to Psychoanalysis in 
the 1970s,” in Foucault Now, (ed.) James Faubion (2014). 
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is only possible to imagine Foucault as ever having been uncritical of psychoanalysis if 
one overlooks the History of Madness, which is indeed exactly what Eribon does in his 
biography of Foucault in regard to Foucault’s relation to psychoanalysis.35 Eribon and 
Huffer’s positions effectively cancel out the main force of the other’s since each points out 
tendencies in Foucault’s thought that directly contradict the other’s narrative. 
Another queer reader of Foucault who argues in a quite opposite direction to Huffer, 
this time in a pro-psychoanalytic way, is De Lauretis, who complains that those who read 
the History of Sexuality in isolation are not led to underestimate the scale of Foucault’s 
opposition to psychoanalysis but, on the contrary, to underestimate the extent to which it 
presupposes a background of psychoanalytic understanding.36 She sees Foucault’s project 
as deeply psychoanalytic, a Lacan-influenced hyper-Freudianism that posits a more 
severe Unconscious–Conscious split than Freud does, with the subject appearing even 
more powerless than in Freud.37 While it might certainly be true that psychoanalysis has 
influenced Foucault’s thinking in this deep way, this cannot, however, explain away the 
real criticisms he levels at psychoanalysis in this book. De Lauretis indeed does not try to 
explain them away but rather simply defends psychoanalysis against Foucault, accusing 
him of wanting to reduce Freudian drives (Triebe – 'instincts' in the old ‘Standard Edition’ 
translation of Freud to English) to the effect of power relations when he says that 'sexuality 
must not be described as a stubborn drive'.38 Here, though, I would suggest she misreads 
Foucault: his dictum does not imply that drives do not exist but rather only that sexuality 
as such is not a drive. Indeed, I have argued that something like Freudian drives are 
actually presupposed by Foucault's Nietzschean account of power.39 
A more modest attempt to align the first volume of Foucault’s History of Sexuality with 
psychoanalysis is made by Deborah Cook, who makes the point that while Foucault might 
disagree with what he calls the ‘repressive hypothesis’, this is only because of its exclusive 
focus on repression;40 he substantively agrees that the repression identified by 
psychoanalysis in relation to sex is real and self-consciously seeks a liberation that 
includes but goes beyond mere liberation from sexual repression to liberate us from the 
regime of sex itself.41 Still, all this means is that Foucault does not totally reject 
psychoanalysis in this work, and he once again leaves his criticisms of it there to be 
reckoned with. 
 
35  Michel Foucault, 272. 
36 De Lauretis, Freud’s Drive, 40ff. 
37 Ibid., 47. 
38 Ibid., 41. 
39 Kelly, Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, 53. This argument of mine is based on a passage from Foucault’s 
“Truth and Juridical Forms” where he actually uses the word pulsions (Foucault, Dits et écrits 2 [1994], 548), 
the French translation of Freud’s Triebe, unlike in the passage de Lauretis quotes from Foucault casting him 
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40 Deborah Cook, “Foucault, Freud, and the Repressive Hypothesis,” Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology 45:2 (2014). 
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5. FROM A PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE 
Let us now move on to consider how partisans of psychoanalysis have dealt with 
Foucault’s criticisms. I will begin with someone who, while not primarily a 
psychoanalytic thinker, nonetheless pointedly defends Freud’s legacy against Foucault: 
Derrida. As the highest-profile figure to have written on Foucault’s relationship to 
psychoanalysis, as well as someone who knew Foucault and came from the same milieu, 
Derrida’s reading carries peculiar weight. 
Derrida views Foucault as deeply conflicted in relation to psychoanalysis. He reads 
Foucault as, like himself, ultimately thinking within horizons partly provided by 
psychoanalysis. Thus, when Foucault tries to criticise psychoanalysis, the immanence of 
this critique unavoidably entails ambivalence. This moreover implies a criticism of 
Foucault for failing to understand the way the pervasive influence of psychoanalysis 
limits his ability to critique it, with his lack of awareness of its limits constituting an 
inherent flaw in his critique. While Foucault’s ambivalence cannot be unrelated to the 
influence of psychoanalysis on him, it gives Foucault remarkably little credit to imagine 
him being simply blind to this influence. Something similar may be said of Switzer’s more 
recent reading of Foucault as ‘ambivalent’ in a technical sense developed by Freud.42 
Foucault for his part did not allow that he was caught in the same episteme as Freud – 
even if he does align himself epistemically with Lacan, who in turn sees himself as entirely 
Freudian. Derrida posits a chronologically much longer epistemic unity than Foucault 
does, seeing Freud as essentially similar to the father of modern philosophy, René 
Descartes, and citing Lacan to the effect that we are in a single post-Cartesian 
philosophical era.43 Foucault, by contrast, posits multiple small breaks during the modern 
era and indeed does not really posit the existence of philosophy as such, effectively 
criticising Derrida for maintaining a relatively conventional conception of philosophy as 
a privileged discourse.44  
Moreover, Foucault seems to place different dimensions of single thinkers’ thoughts in 
different epistemes: in the case of Marx, for example, Foucault thinks his economics is an 
obsolete artefact of an older epoch45 but (in his next book) declares Marx’s view of history 
to still be cutting edge.46 Similarly, with Freud, it would seem his thinking about the 
family, sexuality, and the practice of psychoanalysis all align with forces Foucault wants 
to criticise (which incidentally does not necessarily imply that they formally belong to a 
bygone episteme but only that they are things Foucault wants to move away from), 
whereas Freud’s position that consciousness is a relatively weak component of the mind 
is an insight that is relatively radical and actively influences Foucault (for example in his 
above-mentioned notion of a cultural unconscious). 
 
42 “Psychoanalysis.”  
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This is consonant with the reading of Foucault proffered by Jacques-Alain Miller,47 the 
leading theoretician of the largest single school of Lacanians since the death of his father-
in-law Lacan. Miller reads Foucault’s shift from being guided by psychoanalysis in the 
Order of Things to attacking it in the first volume of his History of Sexuality plausibly as 
resulting from a shift of focus: in the former book, Foucault’s focus is on the human 
sciences, where psychoanalysis appears radical for challenging the centrality of human 
consciousness, whereas, in the second, the critical focus is on sexuality, which 
psychoanalysis seems to Foucault to defend. Defending psychoanalysis, however, Miller 
argues that sexuality is too broad a notion for Foucault’s approach to work.48 I will discuss 
this defence in more detail below in relation to Lacan’s thought.  
Psychoanalyst and critical theorist Joel Whitebook sees in Foucault’s differential 
assessment of psychoanalysis a thinker torn between his critical engagement with the 
human sciences and his tendency to valorise transgression, with the former tendency 
leading him towards psychoanalysis and the latter to reject it.49 I think the truth is 
somewhat different here, however, viz. that Foucault’s thought is rigorously negative, 
and he had no interest in building a theoretical framework in the way that psychoanalysis 
tries to. This is in a sense transgressive, but it is not merely transgression for its own sake, 
even if Foucault did derive some jouissance from the transgressive aspect of his work. 
Whitebook is like other Frankfurt School critical theoretic readers of Foucault in seeing 
Foucault’s resistance of theoreticism as invalid, thereby not allowing that an anti-
theoretical methodology makes sense.50 
A recurrent complaint of psychoanalytic readers of Foucault like Whitebook and Miller 
is that he does not really understand psychoanalysis. There is some substance to this 
complaint: Foucault was no scholar of psychoanalysis but rather of a series of historical 
discourses (nineteenth century psychiatry, psychology and ethnology in particular) to 
which psychoanalysis was only obliquely related. In light of this, an obvious 
interpretative move is to suggest that Foucault’s critique of psychoanalysis should be 
understood as applying only to the discourse’s institutional imbrications rather than 
taken to say anything about its theoretical claims (an approach taken by Philippe Van 
Haute).51 As Amy Allen notes, however, Foucault’s position does not readily allow for 
such a distinction given his emphasis on the complex interrelation of knowledge and 
power.52 Foucault holds that it is necessary for genealogy always to ‘wage its struggle’ 
against ‘organised scientific discourse’, citing psychoanalysis as an example,53 and he 
indeed claims that the history of the dispositif of sexuality ‘can serve as an archaeology of 
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psychoanalysis’,54 implying that historically psychoanalysis cannot be separated from the 
device of sexuality.  
 Still, this does not imply that a separation cannot be effected at some point; indeed, 
Foucault’s ‘rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourses’ implies precisely that one and 
the same discourse may have utterly different political significance in different contexts.55 
Indeed, Foucault more or less explicitly allows this point in relation to psychoanalysis in 
his celebrated 1969 essay ‘What Is An Author?’, where he speaks of the transformative 
effects of ‘a re-examination of the books of Freud’,56 alluding surely to Lacan’s work 
(Lacan himself was in the audience of the original lecture and later lauded it in his 
seminar).57 In this relation, I would draw particular attention to the way in which Lacan 
used Freud’s apparently patriarchal (Oedipus) and sexist (phallus) vocabulary in new 
ways. And while it is quite clear that Foucault's methodology is not simply 
psychoanalytical (even if it is influenced by psychoanalysis), Foucault does not claim that 
his approach is the only correct one, and he does not in principle oppose the promiscuous 
combination of insights from his thought with those from elsewhere, as with 
psychoanalysis in queer theory and feminist thought. Indeed, he explicitly offers his work 
as a toolbox from which one can take what one needs.58 
6. LACAN: SO NEAR AND YET SO FAR 
Huffer and others claim that Foucault’s rejection of core aspects of psychoanalysis 
specifically precludes any recombination of his thought with psychoanalysis. The 
Foucauldian feminist/queer critique of psychoanalysis is that psychoanalysis gives us a 
limiting, hetero-normative, patriarchal model of the psyche that denies human 
potentiality. Generically, psychoanalysis stands accused of invoking an invariant model 
of the human psyche that ignores historical change, in contrast to Foucault’s historical 
accounts of the constitution of the subject. While Foucault does indeed accuse 
psychoanalysis of lacking a sense of historicity, this seems a somewhat unfair accusation 
inasmuch as psychoanalysis, at least since Freud’s Totem and Taboo, has explicitly 
concerned itself with giving an historical account of the development of the human 
psyche. Of course, the claims of that book apply to the entire swath of human history in a 
way Foucault could not endorse – and indeed he explicitly criticises such work for not 
accounting for the history of ‘the production of theories of sexuality’59 – but the notion 
that basic structures of the psyche are historically constituted has allowed for a historically 
 
54 Foucault, History of Sexuality 1, 130. 
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differentiated account of metapsychology to develop, particularly within the Lacanian 
orientation.60 Foucault’s differentiation of himself from Lacan on the basis of his own 
Heideggerianism may be taken primarily to allude to his following Heidegger in taking 
an historical approach to subjectivity, but this comparison ignores the influence of 
Heidegger on Lacan himself. Lacan famously exchanged visits with Heidegger, and 
Lacan’s historical enframing of psychoanalysis is at times directly Heideggerian, for 
instance in his straightforwardly Heideggerian claim that ‘in the course of man’s history 
things have happened to him that have changed the subject’s relation to being’.61 Indeed, 
Lacan was clearly receptive to using Foucault’s own historical studies to buttress 
psychological understanding in a way that has paved the way for further work bringing 
Lacan and Foucault together.62 While Foucault might have thought that Lacan was trying 
to install desire as a permanent and ineluctable truth of human existence,63 one might also 
read Lacan as trying to problematise desire much as Foucault did. Indicating the 
attentiveness to historicity of Millerian Lacanianism in particular, Miller contends that 
‘psychoanalysis does, after all, contain within itself the possibility of its own mortality. 
Freud knew this and said it’. 64 Much depends in the end on whether one reads Freud and 
Lacan as theoretical dogmatists. They are often read in this way, but they were constantly 
revising their thinking in an open-ended way, with neither figure ever making any claim 
to theoretical completeness, and the notion that scientific discourses cannot capture truth 
is constantly reiterated as a guiding principle of Lacan’s epistemology, which focuses on 
the inability of linguistic knowledge to grasp what he calls ‘the real’. 
Here, as often, Lacan is rather close to Foucault’s own position. As Samo Tomšič notes, 
Foucault and Lacan have very similar epistemological orientations rooted in a particular 
strand of twentieth century French philosophy.65 Lacan’s name is peculiarly prominent in 
the secondary literature on Foucault’s relation to psychoanalysis with good reason: Lacan 
was the single most prominent living psychoanalytic thinker in the scene in which 
Foucault was working, and clearly the psychoanalytic figure closest to Foucault himself, 
in time, space, and in intellectual influences. I have already mentioned attendances by the 
two Parisian intellectuals at one another’s events; Foucault indeed knew Lacan personally 
and dined at his house several times.66 What is striking about their relationship, however, 
is that, despite geographical, intellectual and even personal proximity, Foucault remained 
ultimately relatively uncomprehending of Lacan’s thought. I will now briefly trace the 
history of his engagement with that thought. 
 
60 See, for example, Samo Tomšič, “Better Failures: Science and Psychoanalysis” in Lacan Contra Foucault: 
Subjectivity, Sex, and Politics, ed. Nadia Bou Ali and Rohit Goel (2019) on Lacan’s analysis of the effects of 
capitalism on subjectivity. 
61 Jacques Lacan, The Triumph of Religion [2005] (2013), 22. 
62 E.g. Lee Grieveson, “The death of psychoanalysis? Foucault on Lacan,” New Formations 31 (1997). 
63 History of Sexuality 1, 150. 
64 “Michel Foucault and Psychoanalysis,” 59; cf. Lacan, Triumph of Religion, 67. 
65 Tomšič, “Better Failures: Science and Psychoanalysis”; see also Mark G E Kelly, “Foucault, Subjectivity, 
and Technologies of the Self,” in A Companion to Foucault, ed. Chris Falzon, Timothy O’Leary, and Jana 
Sawicki (2013). 
66 Eribon, Michel Foucault, 154. 
Foucault On Psychoanalysis 
Foucault Studies, No. 28, 96-119.  110  
Foucault attended Lacan’s first public seminar in 1953 but claimed not to have 
understood much.67 Jacqueline Verdeaux, who brought Foucault onto the Binswanger 
translation project, remembered Foucault as seriously hostile to Lacan at that time.68 
However, this represents a point very early in Foucault’s intellectual development and 
quite early in Lacan’s. 
When Foucault makes more positive comments about Freud in the History of Madness, 
in contrast to the relatively negative ones there, he does so in a way redolent of Lacan, viz. 
for taking ‘up madness at the level of its language’,69 Lacan’s major innovation in 
psychoanalysis being to read Freud’s unconscious as an essentially linguistic 
phenomenon. Foucault further develops this Lacanian reading of Freud in The Order of 
Things.70 During this period, Lacan and Foucault were both popularly considered 
members of the ‘structuralist’ school in France. Eribon indeed claims Foucault’s entire 
archaeological project was based in part on Lacan.71 
Eribon posits a turn in Foucault’s thought thereafter against psychoanalysis specifically 
opposing Lacanianism,72 citing Foucault’s comments on the ‘law’ in relation to sexuality.73 
Since Lacan is the only major psychoanalytic thinker to strongly thematise this concept, 
these indeed must be directed towards him. Foucault thus displays a familiarity with 
Lacan’s terminology but shows some ignorance of its meaning by inferring from the use 
of this term a conventional conception of power focused on the law, an accusation 
repeated recently by Huffer.74 However, as Yannis Stavrakakis points out, Lacan’s concept 
of the law has ‘a certain homology with Foucault’s conception of power’ insofar as Lacan 
conceives the law as not merely repressive but ‘productive’.75 Van Haute notes that 
Foucault effectively considers a possible response by Lacanians to his criticisms that the 
concept of the law does not imply a repressive model of power but nonetheless does imply 
a juridical conception of it.76 However, van Haute points out that Lacan’s notion of the 
‘law’ is not only intended as non-repressive but as non-juridical; it is rather a metaphor, 
one Lacanians themselves have indeed tended to take too literally. It refers either to the 
subject’s encounter with a rule-governed language outside their control or to the ‘law of 
castration’, which implies a complex by which the subject limits their investment in 
particular objects of desire in relation to which desire is itself constituted.  
Van Haute also seeks to exempt Lacan from Foucault’s critique of psychoanalysis in 
the first volume of his History of Sexuality as instantiating a confessional culture by which 
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we are encouraged to constitute ourselves as (sexual) subjects through the production of 
narratives about ourselves.77 Van Haute shows that Lacan does not conceive of analysis 
as intended to attach the self to a ‘true’ identity. Rather, consistent with an epistemology 
that does not allow any final truth to be discovered through language, the Lacanian 
position is that the end of analysis involves realising that there is no true identity to be 
discovered. Indeed, Lacan himself pointedly rejected any identification of analysis with 
religious confession, claiming that ‘in analysis, we begin by explaining to people that they 
are not there in order to confess’.78 
All this I think betokens a relatively superficial engagement with Lacan on Foucault’s 
part. His relative lack of knowledge of the nuances of Lacanianism emerges in an 
interview with analysts shortly after the publication of History of Sexuality I, where 
Foucault is surprised to learn from Miller that, as Miller puts it, it is a Lacanian ‘axiom’ 
that ‘that there is no sexual relation’.79 This formula is basic enough to Lacan’s account of 
sexuality that this seems to indicate that Foucault has no knowledge of it at all. I do not 
mean to imply that there is anything reprehensible about the unfamiliarity. Lacan’s 
position has always been hard to understand, and, moreover, Lacan’s thought was 
primarily transmitted orally during his lifetime through seminars, while his writing was 
scattered, occasional, and relatively impenetrable. Foucault noted as much himself: ‘From 
what I've managed to learn about his theories, Lacan has certainly influenced me. But I 
haven't followed him in a way that would enable me to say that I've had an in-depth 
experience of his teaching. I've read some of his books; however, it's well known that in 
order to understand Lacan well, it's not only necessary to read him but also to listen to his 
lectures, participate in the seminars he gives, and, if possible, to undergo analysis with 
him. I haven't done any of that. In 1955, when Lacan commenced the essential part of his 
teaching, I was already outside France’.80 
Indeed, Foucault never attempted comprehensively to understand psychoanalysis 
more broadly, he never undertook a study of it in the way he did earlier psychiatry and 
psychology, and this was something in the order of a conscious choice on his part. While 
he does comment on it, it is never the actual target of his writing so much as something 
that is noted on the periphery. He simply does not have an overall assessment of 
psychoanalysis as an object but rather assesses it as it appears in relation to ethnology 
(where his assessment is broadly positive, seeing it as offering a critical tool) and in 
relation to the histories of psychiatry and sexuality (where psychoanalysis is caught in 
Foucault’s line of fire). 
Given his ignorance of the topic, what motivated his relative turn against 
psychoanalysis? I would suggest one factor might have been his burgeoning friendship 
in the early 1970s with Gilles Deleuze, and his reading of the 1972 book Deleuze co-wrote 
with the dissident Lacanian psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, the title of which 
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clearly trumpets its anti-Freudian agenda. This influence becomes immediately palpable 
in Foucault’s thinking, for example in his 1973 lectures ‘Truth and Juridical Forms’, where 
he discusses at length how appealing he finds Deleuze’s anti-Oedipal contentions, before 
distancing himself from ‘structuralism’ and declaring a filiation instead with Deleuze, 
Guattari, and Jean-François Lyotard 81 – a quite different list of intellectual confreres to the 
one he had provided in the mid-1960s when he was aligning himself with Lacan. Still, 
even here, faced in the post-lecture discussion with questions from the psychoanalytical 
scholar Hélio Pellegrino, Foucault notes that Guattari himself remains a kind of 
psychoanalyst and hence does not in fact pronounce himself opposed to psychoanalysis 
as such.82 
I would suggest, then, that it is perhaps not mere coincidence that Foucault’s anti-
psychoanalytic invective effectively ceases after 1977 when his relationship with Deleuze 
cooled.83 Something else that year to which a disappearance of Foucault’s hostility to 
psychoanalysis could speculatively be attributed in part is his published discussion with 
Miller et al. I read in this interview a genuine change of position on Foucault’s part in the 
face of persistent challenges from his psychoanalytic interlocutors. Foucault initially 
disputes the historical significance of psychoanalysis, but he concedes to his interviewers 
the importance of Freud’s conceptualisation of the unconscious, something he had himself 
earlier asserted in The Order of Things, and is apparently quite surprised to learn about an 
essentially negative account of sexuality.84 By the following year, Foucault is averring that 
he is not ‘anti-psychoanalytic’ and that “although my project, in doing the history of 
sexuality, is the reverse of that perspective, this is not at all to say that psychoanalysis is 
mistaken, not at all to say that there is not in our societies a misunderstanding by the 
subject of his own desire,”85 the last clause clearly referring to Lacanian perspectives. 
In 1981, Foucault was interviewed on the occasion of Lacan’s death.86 This very brief 
interview, never published in English, is entirely overlooked in the Anglophone 
secondary literature on Foucault and psychoanalysis. In it, Foucault notes that Lacan 
intended to wrench psychoanalysis away from psychiatry and psychology, that he (like 
Foucault) opposed normalisation, and that reading Lacan’s early writings had been an 
influence on Foucault along with the rest of his generation in understanding subjectivity. 
Given the context, one can expect, of course, that Foucault would here focus on the points 
of agreement between the two thinkers, but it is not insignificant that Foucault readily 
identifies these particular points. 
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7. THE SUBJECT AND THE LATE FOUCAULT: 
THE PROBLEM OF VOCABULARY 
The problem that Foucault runs into with the notion of the ‘law’ is one of translation 
between Lacan’s idiosyncratic terminology and Foucault’s own conceptual lexicon. Good 
work translating such vocabulary has been done, including van Haute’s on the law and 
Bersani’s on the ‘sexual’, as well as Tim Dean’s work carefully noting the differences in 
the two thinkers’ use of the notion of pleasure.87 However, false friends continue to 
mislead. Given that most of Lacan’s key terms are simply absent from Foucault’s work, 
scholarship bringing the two together tends to focus on the few terms that appear in both 
thinkers’ writing, the most prominent example being the word ‘subject’. Butler is a case 
in point here, effectively taking this word to mean the same thing for both thinkers.88 This 
conflation of Lacan’s subject with Foucault’s is compounded, de Lauretis suggests, by 
running together different senses of the word used by Foucault himself, conflating ‘the 
subject of Foucault’s later works, the individual agent of practices that make sexuality an 
“art of existence”, with the subject of reverse discourse in Volume I'.89 These three 
accounts of subjectivity – Foucault’s 1970s analysis of its constitution correlative to power 
relations, Foucault’s 1980s analysis of ancient subjectivity constituted through ethical 
‘practices of the self’, and Lacan’s understanding of subjectivity as the psyche formed 
through infantile experiences – do not mutually exclude one another, but to use them 
together successfully would require careful conceptual mediation, and this, I would 
contend, is generally missing in attempts to bring them together. Miller, for example, 
claims explicitly that, in Foucault’s late work, where subjectivity was prominently 
thematised for the first time, ‘Foucault’s subject had become the same as Lacan’s’.90 
Birman reads Foucault and Lacan as tracing a somewhat similar trajectory, with their 
respective late works becoming increasingly simpatico with one another’s.91 Deborah 
Cook has likewise seen similarities between psychoanalytic accounts of the formation of 
the subject and Foucault’s late work.92 We should remember, however, that it is precisely 
in the context of his late work that Foucault suggested that his and Lacan’s approaches to 
the relationship of subjectivity and truth were fundamentally distinct. Lacan’s 
understanding of subjectivity rests on an edifice of psychoanalytical elaboration which is 
completely absent from Foucault’s work. As I have detailed elsewhere, Foucault conceives 
subjectivity as correlative to practices, where Lacan understands it as a complex 
psychological structure established early in life.93 
Foucault (1980, 213) himself reaches a similar conclusion in relation to sexuality rather 
than subjectivity when, in conversation with Miller, the latter insists that sexuality is, from 
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a Lacanian perspective, precisely something that does not have a history: Foucault takes 
the point but notes that there is a history of sexuality in a different sense, that is, that the 
two thinkers mean quite different things by ‘sexuality’. Apropos here is Bersani’s (1995, 
98) argument that differing conceptions of sexuality conceal the fact that Freud is engaged 
in fundamentally the same project as Foucault in the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality, namely ‘desexualization’, that is, the project of getting rid of the sexual as a 
special category. He argues that Freud engaged in an 'attempt to desexualize pleasure' – 
albeit one that is obscured by the fact that Freud's desexualisation is performed by 
broadening the concept of the sexual to cover what would ordinarily be considered 
nonsexual, rather than declaring war on the very concept of ‘sex’ as Foucault in effect 
does. Bersani (1995, 102) notes that Foucault distinguishes between the sexual and the 
'erotic', and that what Freud means when he talks about the sexual is in effect what 
Foucault calls the erotic.  
Other commentators have compared psychoanalysis with other concepts in Foucault’s 
late work, but I think these comparisons similarly tend to indicate a great distance 
between the two perspectives. Simon O’Sullivan has compared Foucault’s late reflections 
on ethics to Lacan’s own consideration of psychoanalysis as an ethical practice, ultimately 
telling us that Foucault and Lacan have different problematics.94 Nancy Luxon has 
suggested that the ancient practice of parrhesia (courageous truth-telling), in which 
Foucault was in his last years so interested, resembles psychoanalysis,95 but the similarity 
here is thin, amounting to the fact that both have some commitment to the truth and 
require some form of courage – in particular, the specifically political and individual 
characteristics of ancient parrhesia as a form of telling truth to power at the risk of being 
punished for doing so can be likened to the stakes of psychoanalysis only in a quite 
metaphorical way. 
8. CONCLUSION 
Taking Foucault’s remarks on psychoanalysis together, we get a mixed picture, with 
psychoanalysis in some respects representing a radically new way of thinking and in other 
ways failing to break with tendencies that Foucault wants to critique. However, I have 
suggested that Foucault’s identification of these continuities with past practice in 
psychoanalysis is unreliable, or at least that the continuities are contingent. Foucault 
justifiably identifies affiliations of psychoanalysis to strategies of power that he wants to 
resist, but the centrality of these to psychoanalysis is contestable. Psychoanalysis has come 
to be increasingly separated from institutional psychiatry in much of the world in the 
decades since Foucault’s time and instead has come to figure again as a counter-discourse, 
a tendency palpable already early in its history in Freud’s preference for maintaining 
 
94 Simon O’Sullivan, “Lacan’s Ethics and Foucault’s ‘Care Of The Self’: Two Diagrams of the Production of 
Subjectivity (and of the Subject’s Relation to Truth),” Parrhesia 10 (2010). 
95 Nancy Luxon, Crisis of Authority: Politics, Trust, and Truth-Telling in Freud and Foucault (2013). 
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psychoanalysis’s independence from academic and medical institutions.96 I would thus 
characterise Foucault’s relationship to psychoanalysis as to some extent a missed 
encounter, owing to Foucault encountering psychoanalysis personally at a time when it 
was too closely associated with strategies of power. This, then, implies no criticism of 
Foucault since he could not be expected to investigate every possible tangent from his 
research fully, but rather an intervention against those who invoke Foucault as providing 
good reasons to reject psychoanalysis holus-bolus. 
There was a point early in Foucault’s career when he might have become a primarily 
psychoanalytical – or at least psychological – thinker: this is the Foucault who wrote his 
first book about psychology, took a diploma in psychology, was employed principally as 
a psychology lecturer, worked in a psychiatric hospital, attended Lacan’s seminars, and 
avidly studied Binswanger’s form of existential psychoanalysis. In this context, there was 
already an unavoidable encounter with psychoanalysis. But Foucault deliberately struck 
out from this context on a different trajectory, which was the historical critique of the 
medicalisation of the mind. While it is true, as several commentators point out, that 
Foucault was ineluctably influenced in this effort by the critical ethos of psychoanalysis 
itself, this also required a critical distance from psychoanalysis, as noted by other (and 
some of the same) commentators. This critical distance is achieved precisely by a 
deliberate decision not to study psychoanalysis, even if psychoanalysis continually loomed 
closely enough that Foucault found himself at every turn having to engage with it 
marginally – sometimes in the modality of saying laudatory things about the ways in 
which psychoanalysis might be doing similar things to him (in The Order of Things, for 
example) and at other times noting its similarity to the main object of his critical 
genealogies (in The History of Sexuality, for example).  
A second proper encounter might have occurred – but clearly did not – in Foucault’s 
late work on subjectivity. Foucault’s archaeological work had been premised on a 
bracketing of the subjective in order to attend to words at the level of discourses, finding 
the structural underpinnings (that is, the epistemes) that govern the production of 
knowledges, and this took him diametrically away from psychology. He had then moved 
on to consider discursive production in relation to strategies of power, which again 
bypassed the question of depth psychology in favour of understanding the specifically 
political constitution of subjectivity. He could perhaps have moved next, as Judith Butler 
in his wake has, to consider the ‘psychic life of power’. But this is pointedly not what 
Foucault does: rather, he goes back to an antiquity in which contemporary psychology 
would be deeply anachronistic and prefers instead to understand ancient subjectivity in 
terms of practices, which is effectively (though not in as many words) how the ancients 
themselves viewed the problem. One reason for this is surely historiographical, but there 
is another one, I think, namely that Lacan was already doing the structural analysis of 
subjectivity as a psychological phenomenon. For Foucault to move into this space would 
have been redundant and reduplicative from a scholarly perspective. It is also the case 
that his interests did not lead him in this direction. One might always speculate that he 
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might have moved in such a direction later in his studies had he lived longer, but there is 
no particular reason to believe he would have, nor indeed is there any reason Foucault 
should have done that. Ultimately, to the extent his studies are non-psychoanalytic, this 
is no reason they should be deemed illegitimate from a psychoanalytic perspective, any 
more than a Foucauldian perspective should imply a condemnation of psychoanalytical 
ones. 
Foucault never seeks to dismiss psychoanalysis in the way some of his followers have. 
Foucault’s overall assessment of psychoanalysis, I think, is neatly encapsulated in this 
1975 assessment of Jan van Ussel’s then-recent work on the history of sexuality: ‘Although 
such notions may be valid in psychological or psychoanalytic analysis, they cannot, in my 
view, account for the mechanisms of a historical process’.97 That is to say, Foucault thinks 
that psychoanalysis has not performed the kind of historical analysis that he is engaged 
in, but this implies no rejection of it qua psychological inquiry, only that it is foreign to 
the problem that he has set himself from at least the time of his doctoral thesis The History 
of Madness onwards, the point at which he decided that his life’s task was fundamentally 
an historical one into the emergence of psychology as a disciplinary formation rather than 
the history of the human psyche. 
Miller’s schematic account of Foucault’s attitude towards psychoanalysis as shifting 
primarily according to the shifts in the focus of his work, from psychiatry to epistemology 
and back again, is essentially correct. Indeed, I think something similar can be said of most 
of the attitudes of most scholars on the topic: queer theorists and feminists, for example, 
who are concerned with attacking the abuses of psychiatric power, tend to accentuate 
Foucault’s anti-psychoanalytic strand, whereas those trying to articulate a positive 
account of the psyche prefer to read him as compatible with the resources they find in 
psychoanalytic theory, with both sides naturally tending to ignore details that do not help 
their practical purpose. 
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